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Beyond the Kyoto Protocol 
Warwick J. McKibbin 
Peter J. Wilcoxen 
1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which was negotiated in Kyoto in December 1997, is yet to be ratified.  There are 
still many unresolved problems with implementing this convention -- not least is the problem 
that the Kyoto Protocol is fundamentally unsustainable2.  Little progress in implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol was achieved at previous meetings in Buenos Aires in 1998 and Bonn in 1999. 
The next major negotiations will be held in The Hague in November 2000, although there will be 
intense activity leading up to this meeting, because it will be the last serious chance for countries 
to implement the Kyoto Protocol. Rhetoric will not achieve the tight targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol and at some stage either actual policies must be implemented or the Kyoto Protocol 
must be jettisoned.  
Given the likelihood that the current negotiations will not result in a realistic and 
sustainable climate change policy, it is wor h looking beyond the current state of disarray and 
political maneuvering and revisit the question of what should a realistic climate change policy 
look like. First, the policy should slow down carbon dioxide emissions where it is cost-eff ctive 
to do so, but only as an insurance policy until further information on climate change is 
accumulated.  Second, the policy should involve some mechanism for compensating those 
countries that will be hurt economically without requiring massive transfers of wealth that could 
undermine economic stability.  Third, since climate change is potentially a global problem, any 
solution will require a high degree of consensus both domestically and internationally. Few 
countries want to relinquish sovereignty, especially when the policies in question can have large 
economic effects. A system that does not ultimately include developing countries will do little to 
achieve the goals of the UNFCCC because these countries are large future emitters of carbon and 
because the cheapest reductions will be found where carbon-intensive capital investments have 
not yet been made.  Fourth, the regime must allow new countries to enter with minimum 
disruption and also allow a core group of countries to continue to participate even if other 
countries exit the system at certain times. A system involving many countries that doesn’t 
survive changing composition over time is destined to fail since the reality is that a country’s 
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commitment to the regime is a function of the commitment of political icumben s at any point 
of time. 
Given these criteria, it is clear why the Kyoto Protocol is not succeeding.  We have 
proposed a different approach: one that sets the price of emission permits in the short run, but 
over the longer run, allows the market to det rmine the price of emission allowances. 
2. What is wrong with the Kyoto Protocol?  
The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to impose binding greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission targets for the world’s industrial economies and former communist economies of 
Europe (“Annex I” countries) to be achieved by the period 2008-2012.  By directly binding 
emissions, policymakers presumably believed that they could achieve the goals of the UNFCCC 
through political commitment. Given that fixed targets for emissions by Annex I countries have 
been agreed, although not yet ratified in key countries3, the main issues currently being debated 
are how to minimize the costs of the Kyoto Protocol and how to bring developing countries into 
the agreement. 
The issues of cost minimization and developing country participation are clearly 
recognized in the Kyoto Protocol. Costs are addressed through provision for international trading 
of emission allowances among the countries that accept binding targets. In addition, the Protocol 
provides for a Clean Development Mechanism, under which agents from industrial countries can 
earn emission credits for certified reductions from investments in “clean development” projects 
in developing countries that have not taken on binding targets.  
The first problem with the Kyoto Protocol is the focus on achieving rigid “targets and 
timetables” for emissions reductions at any cost, rather than substantial reductions in emissions 
at reasonable cost.  The problem with fixed targets was understood by some negotiators at Kyoto 
and, thus, flexibility mechanisms, such as permit trading, were included in the Protocol. A 
crucial but mostly ignored issue is that any fixed targets, for the world or for a group of 
countries, even differentiated targets, are likely to be in fficient because we really don’t know 
what these will cost over the long period of time being discussed4. If the actual costs of 
abatement turn out to be much larger than estimated, it is unlikely that countries will continue to 
voluntarily adhere to the Kyoto Protocol.  Some form of extreme enforcement mechanism needs 
                                         
3 As of October 5,1999, 84 countries have signed but only 15 have ratified. 
4See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997a) and Kopp et al (1997) for arguments about the difference 
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to be designed to hold the Protocol together.  Imposing arbitrary but binding targets on 
developing countries is even more problematic because there is even greater uncertainty about 
what the appropriate targets should be. An overly tight target will cause countries to depart from 
the agreement and an overly loose target will mean that low cost opportunities will have been 
lost. 
Permit trading within the Kyoto Protocol is essential to minimize these problems. 
However even a permit trading system could be problematic. In a series of papers (McKibbin 
and Wilcoxen (1997a.1997b)) we have pointed out that under some plausible scenarios for the 
future evolution of the global economy, the economic pressures caused by the large transfers of 
wealth internationally that underlie the claims over permits could cause severe fluctuations in 
real exchange rates and international capital and trade flows. Whether this actually emerges as a 
future problem is highly uncertain but will depend on a number of factors including the ultimate 
price of permits and the initial allocation of permits. In particular, international wealth transfers 
may be a problem if permit allocations are used excessively as a way of persuading countrie  to 
participate in an agreement. Although there is uncertainty about whether this effect  is large or 
small, the main point is that we can’t be sure that the economic problems we highlight will not 
emerge in the future.  
Another problem with permit trading under the Kyoto Protocol is that the price of permits 
for all countries depends on the demand and supply of permits by large countries. If one large 
country cheats, then the value of permits for all countries will be affected and the system will 
likely collapse. There is currently no international rule of law that can prevent this from 
happening, nor is it easy to see what credible penalties could be imposed to prevent this from 
happening under all possible scenarios.  It is also hard to imagine why developing counties 
would want to participate in a centralized system like the Kyoto Protocol, especially once the 
enforcement mechanisms are made explicit and without knowing the possible costs of accepting 
a binding emissions target. 
Overall it seems that both politically and economically, there may be potential problems 
with the Kyoto Protocol involving the possibly large wealth transfers between economies. More 
fundamentally, the incentives of key players are not clearly consistent with the proocol under 
extreme developments, without some, as yet to be identified, enforcement (and monitoring) 
mechanism. 
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3. An Alternative Approach 
Our proposal is an attempt to design a decentralized but coordinated system that gives 
participating countries the incentive to participate as well as giving appropriate incentives to 
households and firms to change the amount of carbon emissions where it is cost effective to do 
so. We also build in the notion that developing countries should not incur the same costs in 
short run as industrialized economies. But investment decisions in the developing countries need 
to be conditioned on expected future costs of abatement in these countries.
The basis of our system is the creation of two new assets (in each economy) as a part of 
establishing a clear system of property rights with respect to carbon emissions. The two assets 
are emission permits and emission endowments. An emission permit is an asset that is required 
every year to be held by a carbon producer in order to produc  a single unit of carbon.  The price 
of the permits will be equal to the marginal cost of reducing an additional unit of carbon for 
every carbon emitter in an economy.  
An emission endowment gives the owner an annual emission permit that can be used in a
given country every year forever.  The endowment reflects a country’s longer term commitment 
to emissions reductions but is not a binding constraint in the short run. There would be markets 
created domestically for both permits and endowments. The holder of an emission endowment 
can either decide to claim an emission permit and use it for current activities, or to sell that 
permit on the current market or to sell the endowment depending on the price they currently see 
versus the price they expect in future years. The price of the emission permit will be the marginal 
cost of abatement in a given year whereas the price of the emission endowment will be the 
expected future marginal cost of abatement. 
As under the earlier forms of our proposal, in Annex I countries, rather than setting 
targets for emissions, we propose setting targets for the marginal abatement costs – we make the 
cost of cutting emission certain (i.e. the fixed permit price) and the environmental outcome 
uncertain. Specifically, the domestic price of permits would be guaranteed within each Annex I 
country for a period of 10 years at a maximum of $US10 per ton of carbon5. This ixed price is 
achieved by each government in each Annex 1 market selling as many emission permits as 
required to keep the price from rising above $US10 per ton. There is no cap on permits and 
therefore no cap on emissions but the marginal cost of abatement is known for a fixed period. 
                                         
5 Both the period between negotiations nd the price would be the subject of negotiation. 
   6
Many studies estimate that the permit price in 2010 associated with the Kyoto targets,range from 
$US65 to many hundreds of dollars. Thus in Annex I countries there is likely to be an initial 
excess demand for permits and the permit price of $US10 per ton will be binding. The price of 
emission endowments on the other hand would be flexible (given a fixed quantity of 
endowments) and would reflect expected future prices of emission permits.  
The dilemma facing developing countries is that they are yet to emit the substantial 
amounts of carbon that have been essential to the development strategies of Annex I countries. 
Yet to go down the high carbon path of Annex I countries implies possibly very large future 
costs for developing countries if climate change becomes as fundamentally important as some 
scenarios would imply. Most of the costs of climate hange abatement occur because existing 
economic structures have to be changed to be less carbon intensive. Most of this cost is a capital 
loss given that physical capital, which is largely fixed, is expensive to change quickly. Changing 
economic structures is far less expensive to do before the capital stock is in place rather than 
after it is in place. Just as there are different costs of carbon abatement across countries, there are 
also different costs across time. It is clear that a low-cos option for abatement over future years 
will be found in changing the future energy intensity of developing economies. This issue is 
recognized in our proposal by the use of endowments versus permits in developing countries in a 
different way to that in Annex I countries. A developing country would be included in our 
regime by negotiating an initial endowment allocation that allows for the fact that rapid growth is 
likely during development. 
For example an endowment of  (100+X)% for each participating non-Annex I country 
would allow a large expansion in fossil fuel use before the constraint becomes  binding. If the 
government in the non-An ex I country were to distribute all of this endowment, the price of 
permits would be zero  in the first year because there would be an excess supply of permits. Thus 
a developing country would face no short run cost of emitting carbon.  However, the price of 
endowments would be non-zero because the future expected price of permits would be expected 
to rise as the constraint becomes binding.  We have introduced a price signal to current firms and 
households within non-An ex I countries that future carbon emissions will be priced. Thus they 
have the incentive to begin investing in low carbon emitting technology so that they can sell their 
future permits or their endowments and make a future profit from planning low-cost batement 
over time. There are no direct costs introduced into the economy in the short term because the 
annual price of permits will initially be zero.  However, there is a price signal through the price 
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of endowments. Thus decisions about future energy use can incorporate the cost of carbon 
emissions without imposing short run costs. Of course, the price of the emission endowments in 
any economy will reflect the credibility of that government’s commitment as well as the 
expected future growth prospects of the economy. 
Another important aspect of this approach, is that developing economies that grow slowly 
will hit a binding emissions constraint much later than rapidly growing economies. Thus 
countries begin to contribute to the global reduction of carbon emissions when a country’s 
capacity to pay is higher. 
In the long run, all countries are paying the same price for carbon whereas we have 
allowed a transition path witdifferential abatement between Annex I and non-An ex I 
economies. This is an important difference to the Kyoto Protocol because there is currently no 
firm commitment by developing economies. Once a developing country joins the Kyoto permit 
trading system, its price of carbon and hence marginal cost of abatement would be the same as in 
industrial economies, which some argue is not equitable. No amount of initial permit allocation 
within a multi-country permit trading system would change the fact that they incur short run 
costs for carbon emissions - the same as industrial economies. This is precisely why developing 
countries have not committed to the Kyoto Protocol. 
We believe it should be up to individual countries how they allocate the emission 
endowments. Once the endowments are created the system then evolves over time with the 
annual price of permits being set every ten years by international agreement.  There is no need 
for international trade in emission permits because the price of permits is the sam in all markets 
by construction. There is no reason for a Japanese firm to buy an emission permit from Russia 
when they can get a permit from the Japanese government for the same price. There is no trade 
allowed in emission endowments even though the values of these may differ across countries – 
this is the tradeoff of short run efficiency for equity. 
The net effect of this policy would be to raise the current and expected future price of 
emitting carbon in Annex I countries. This would discourage increases in emissions, and 
encourage reductions in emissions where they are cost- ffective, but without levying a sudden 
multi-billion dollar burden on fuel users.  This also creates a mechanism for banking and renting 
emission rights that is internally consistent and credible. To temporarily raise emissions above an 
initial endowment holding, a firm can buy a short term emission permit from the permit market. 
To bank emission reductions for future use a firm can sell permits in the permit market (just like 
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renting the emission endowments annually) but hold the emission endowment for future 
emission increases. No special institutional constructions are required outside the creation of the 
two assets and a domestic mechanism that ensures the value of these assets through monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms and a rule of law that exists wit in each economy. It is true that 
techniques of monitoring and enforcement will likely will differ across countries, but this 
difference does not directly harm the effectiveness of a giv n outcome in another country.  
A key feature of the policy is that it is flexible.  The permit price could be adjusted by 
international negotiation at a regular interval (we propose every decade) or as needed when 
better information becomes available on the seriousness or otherwise of climate change and the 
cost of reducing emissions. Equally important, it would be easy to add countries to the system 
over time: those interested in joining would only have to adopt the policy domestically and no 
international negotiations would be required. This flexibility is crucial because it is clear from 
current negotiations that only a small subset of countries would agree to be initial participants in 
a climate change treaty. Also countries can defect from the sheme without debasing the value of 
the permits for the remaining countries.  Although the defection of a country would be 
undesirable, the system is sustainable. 
Since the policy does not focus on achieving a specified target at any cost (indeed the 
cost of our proposal is known with certainty), such a system would be far more likely to be 
ratified, and by more countries.  The political attractiveness of our proposal is that it is a 
decentralized, coordinated system implemented by individual countries within national rat er 
than supranational institutional structures. 
4. Conclusion  
The system we advocate is flexible enough to adapt to changing political, economic and 
climate circumstances. Most importantly, we believe that the system we have designed although 
simple in concept, solves many of the insurmountable problems of the Kyoto Protocol and 
delivers an outcome in which global emissions will be lower than otherwise would be the case.  
  
 
 
 
 
Key elements of the McKibbin Wilcoxen Proposal 
All countries create two assets: 
- an emission permit which is required by fossil fuel industries to supply a unit of carbo  
annually; 
- an emission endowment which gives the owner an emission permit every year forever. 
 
All countries create two domestic markets:  
    - a domestic emission permit trading system with a fixed price of $US10 per ton of carbon in
       Annex I countries and a cap price of $US10 in non-Annex I countries;  
    - a domestic emission endowment trading system with a flexible price. 
 
In 2000, all countries are allowed to make a one off allocation of emission endowments 
domestically based on Kyoto targets for Annex I countries and current emissions plus x% for 
non-Annex I countries. Trading in both markets begins in January 2001. 
 
Permits must be reconciled against production or imports of carbon at an annual basis at the top 
of the carbon production chain – coal mines, oil refineries, gas refiners. Production that is 
exported is exempted. 
 
Every decade there is a meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC to evaluate 
the extent of abatement and the climate science and to negotiate a new price for permits. 
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